Rage Against the Machine: A Reply to Professors Bierschbach and Bibas by Luna, Erik
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2013
Rage Against the Machine: A Reply to Professors
Bierschbach and Bibas
Erik Luna
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Luna, Erik, "Rage Against the Machine: A Reply to Professors Bierschbach and Bibas" (2013). Minnesota Law Review. 377.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/377
  
 
2245 
Response 
Rage Against the Machine: A Reply to 
Professors Bierschbach and Bibas 
Erik Luna†
I. 
 
In the course of a 2009 article on prosecuting corporations, 
Albert Alschuler dropped a footnote mentioning that, “[o]ddly, 
scholars continue to express hope for rulemaking by prosecu-
tors.”1 Certainly, Professor Alschuler had good reason to find 
peculiar the resurgence of academic interest in administrative 
rulemaking in criminal law enforcement. He had been among a 
group of eminent scholars who exposed and critiqued the dis-
cretionary judgments of various legal actors in the criminal 
process.2
                                                                                                                                                                             
†  Sydney and Frances Lewis Professor of Law, Washington and Lee 
University School of Law. Copyright © 2013 by Erik Luna. 
 One of the more attractive responses came from a 
 1. Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of 
Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1389 n.167 (2009) [hereinafter 
Alschuler, Two Ways]. The footnote cited recent works by Stephanos Bibas and 
Rachel Barkow, as well as one of my pieces from a decade earlier. See Rachel 
E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecuto-
rial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959 
(2009); Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 515 (2000). 
 2. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT 
ORDER (1973); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW EN-
FORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1966); Albert W. Alschuler, The Prose-
cutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968); Herman Gold-
stein, Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real, 23 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 140 
(1963); Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: 
Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 
(1960); Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sen-
tencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904 (1962); John Kaplan, The Prosecutori-
al Discretion—A Comment, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 174 (1965); Wayne R. LaFave, 
The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532 
(1970); Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 
(1972); James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Offi-
cials, 1976 DUKE L.J. 651. 
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founding father of administrative law, Kenneth Culp Davis, 
who proposed the tools of his primary field—mostly codified in 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)—as a means to limit 
and guide the power wielded by criminal justice officials.3
The envisioned mash-up of administrative law and crimi-
nal justice never took place, however, and instances of criminal 
justice rulemaking have received mixed reviews at best. The 
most prominent example on the prosecutorial side, the United 
States Attorneys’ Manual, has been rendered largely ineffective 
by a combination of “noncommittal pablum-language,”
  
4 the lack 
of vigorous internal oversight and disciplinary review, and the 
judiciary’s refusal to bind federal prosecutors to their own 
rules.5 The academic literature did not further develop the idea 
of a formal administrative law of criminal justice. The leading 
lights had already moved on to other solutions or entirely dif-
ferent topics.6
Today, the criminal justice system is still marked by broad 
discretion, most of which remains hidden from the public. The 
decision-making patterns constitute the criminal justice sys-
tem’s de facto administrative law, which helps account for the 
many actions that cannot be explained by reference to the pe-
nal code alone. Unlike real administrative law, this authority 
comes without the possibility of public notice and comment or 
the publication of rules and underlying rationales. For the most 
part, only the decision makers themselves and their fellow re-
peat players of criminal justice are able to appreciate the dif-
ference between the law on the books and the secret law of en-
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
 3. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY 
INQUIRY (1969); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975); Kenneth 
Culp Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEX. L. REV. 703 
(1974); see also Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Pros-
ecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3–10, 34 n.108 (1971). 
 4. Alschuler, Two Ways, supra note 1, at 1389. 
 5. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 743–44, 749–55 (1979) 
(holding that law enforcement’s violation of agency regulations was non-
litigable in criminal cases); Ellen S. Podgor, Prosecution Guidelines in the 
United States, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 9, 16–18 
(Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds., 2012) (describing problems with prosecu-
tion guidelines). 
 6. But see Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative 
Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in 
Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 442–51 (1990) (advo-
cating a system of administrative regulation to control discretionary decisions 
by police); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory 
System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 43–49 (1988) (using an economic analysis to 
weigh the administrative costs between a system of discretion versus one of 
rules). 
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forcement. Those most directly affected by the resulting deci-
sions, criminal suspects and defendants, remain largely oblivi-
ous. But so is the entire public. 
In their recent article in this volume, Notice-and-Comment 
Sentencing, Richard Bierschbach and Stephanos Bibas describe 
how opacity in plea bargaining allows the parties to establish 
sentencing policy favoring their own interests over those of the 
public at large.7 They argue for a new sentencing process that 
draws upon the APA’s provisions for notice-and-comment rule-
making,8 with their model requiring, inter alia, advance public 
notice, the opportunity for lay participation, and reasoned and 
responsive sentencing decisions.9 Not only is their proposal 
provocative in the best sense of the word, but Professors 
Bierschbach and Bibas have helped demonstrate why criminal 
justice scholars continue to pursue insights from seemingly 
disparate legal fields that nonetheless struggle with similar 
issues. Administrative agencies and criminal law enforcement 
both “operate under massive statutory delegations of power” 
and “make thousands of value-laden decisions every day,” 
which “greatly affect regulated parties, communities, and the 
general public.”10 Indeed, administrative law exists for the very 
purpose of ensuring that agencies act in the public interest, and 
toward this end, public participation is considered vital to ac-
countable and legitimate decision making.11 But while discre-
tion in criminal justice raises similar issues of accountability 
and legitimacy, “criminal law has not kept pace.”12
Notice-and-Comment Sentencing is commendable on a 
number of fronts and has inspired me to consider other poten-
tially fertile areas for cross-pollination. Not least of all, Profes-
sors Bierschbach and Bibas highlight and seek to realize how 
the criminal justice system benefits from public participation, 
including “shedding the light on the composite public interest,” 
bringing “important facts and data to light,” and “empowering 
citizens to air their views and take part in public policy de-
bate.”
 
13
                                                                                                                                                                             
 7. Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sen-
tencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2012). 
 In this brief Essay, I would like to describe an overarch-
ing problem that plagues criminal justice, one that can be ad-
 8. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). 
 9. See Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 7, at 7–8. 
 10. Id. at 20. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 6. 
  
2248 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:2245 
 
dressed, if at all, by a large-scale program containing ideas 
such as notice-and-comment sentencing and the transparency 
techniques advocated by Ron Wright and Marc Miller.14
II. 
 That 
problem is popular disaffection, and an underlying cause—
apropos to a discussion of administrative law—is the perception 
of the criminal justice system as a bureaucratic machine. 
Interestingly, some have argued for more bureaucracy in 
criminal justice, not less. The backstory goes something like 
this: The public understands very little about crime and the 
criminal process, and what it does know can be drastically 
skewed or distorted. Average citizens tend to be unaware of the 
character and quantity of crime, substantive criminal law and 
policy, constitutional and statutory criminal procedure, pre-
trial and trial proceedings, and sentencing schemes and severi-
ty.15 Among other things, the public misperceives crime rates as 
increasing, especially the level of violent crime, when the rates 
have actually stabilized or declined;16 people also believe that 
longer sentences necessarily reduce crime, despite the fact that 
most scholarship has concluded that increases in punishment 
do not effectively reduce crime or enhance public safety.17 Even 
for those issues of criminal justice that have become part of 
American culture—such as the obligatory warnings and related 
rules of Miranda v. Arizona,18
                                                                                                                                                                             
 14. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Reporting for Duty: The Uni-
versal Prosecutorial Accountability Puzzle and an Experimental Transparency 
Alternative, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 
 popularized by television police 
5, at 392, 392–407; Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Ac-
countability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587 (2010). 
 15. See, e.g., JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETTA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, 
CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 23–47 (1997); Deborah W. Denno, The Perils of 
Public Opinion, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 741, 753–55 (2000); Crime, Punishment 
and Public Opinion: A Summary of Recent Studies and Their Implications for 
Sentencing Policy, SENT’G PROJECT (Jan. 2000), http://www.sentencingproject 
.org/detail/publication.cfm?publication_id=146.  
 16. See, e.g., ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 15, at 8, 30–33; Sara Sun 
Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-
Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 418–20 
(2006) [hereinafter Beale, News Media’s Influence]; Denno, supra note 15, at 
754. 
 17. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Criminal Justice and the Public Imagination, 7 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 81–83 (2009) [hereinafter Luna, Criminal Justice]. 
 18. 384 U.S. 436, 467–79 (1966); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“Miranda has become embedded in routine police prac-
tice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national cul-
ture.”). 
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dramas—there may be an “acoustic separation” between the 
conduct rules understood by the public through mass media 
accounts, and the decision rules recognized by professionals 
and enforced in court.19
This information gap becomes particularly troubling when 
its exploitation leads to counterproductive criminal justice poli-
cies and contributes to the long-term trend of 
overcriminalization.
 
20 Opinion polls can reflect the public’s fear 
of crime and the mistaken belief that crime is on the rise and 
punitive measures offer the antidote.21 To a significant extent, 
popular views on crime are impacted by its representation in 
the media, which is the public’s primary source of information 
on criminal justice issues.22 Although people tend to view the 
major media outlets as being fair and accurate in their cover-
age, economic concerns inevitably influence story selection, con-
tent, and delivery style, consistent with the old news adage 
that “if it bleeds, it leads.”23 Through the media’s depiction, 
crime becomes more salient to audience members, who then 
view crime as a more serious problem than indicated by the 
statistics.24 Even in areas where concern may be unfounded, 
populist pressures create incentives for lawmakers to enact 
new crimes and harsher punishments.25
Given the dysfunctional politics of crime and punishment—
where elected officials govern through crime,
 
26
                                                                                                                                                                             
 19. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2470–71 
(1996). 
 often in response 
 20. See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. 
L. REV. 703, 719–29 (2005) [hereinafter Luna, Overcriminalization Phenome-
non]. 
 21. See Beale, News Media’s Influence, supra note 16, at 418.  
 22. See id. at 441–62; see also Robert Reiner, Media-Made Criminality: 
The Representation of Crime in the Mass Media, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF CRIMINOLOGY 302, 302–29 (Mike Maguire et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007); Sara 
Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime?: Prospects for Restorative Justice in the 
United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 425–28; Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law 
Got to Do with It?: The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal 
Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. 
L. REV. 23, 44–51 (1997). 
 23. Professor Beale’s work has confirmed that stories of crime and vio-
lence are correlated with market share and thus advertising revenues. See 
Beale, News Media’s Influence, supra note 16, at 401. 
 24. See id. at 442. 
 25. See, e.g., Luna, Overcriminalization Phenomenon, supra note 20, at 
719–24; see also Luna, Criminal Justice, supra note 17, at 81–86; Erik Luna & 
Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 21–28 (2010). 
 26. See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR 
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to media-driven public anxieties reflected in opinion polls27—
some prominent scholars have argued for the transfer of 
criminal justice policymaking to non-political expert bodies that 
could rise above the pressures and ineptitude of pure 
majoritarian democracy.28 Potential models include the so-
called independent regulatory agencies, like the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors, the leaders of which are politically 
appointed but serve comparatively lengthy terms of office and 
are not beholden to the electorate.29 This might encourage a 
culture of professionalism in criminal justice as seen in other 
Western nations. In Canada, for instance, “those most likely to 
be in charge of criminal justice reforms are nonelected 
bureaucrats, civil servants, and nongovernmental experts,” who 
are “less susceptible to public pressure.”30
These proposals are thoughtful,
 
31
                                                                                                                                                                             
ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF 
FEAR (2007). 
 no doubt, with an ancient 
pedigree. In the Platonic tradition, the difficult questions of 
 27. See, e.g., Luna, Criminal Justice, supra note 17, at 81–86; Luna, 
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, supra note 20, at 719–24; Luna & Cassell, 
supra note 25, at 21–28. 
 28. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SEN-
SIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 195–227 (2004); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, 
GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE 
STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 181–215 (2001); Philip Pettit, Depo-
liticizing Democracy, 17 RATIO JURIS 52, 58–63 (2004). 
 29. See 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006) (establishing that members of the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors are appointed by the President, confirmed by the 
Senate, and serve fourteen year terms). 
 30. Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob, Punitive Trends and Sta-
ble Imprisonment Rates in Canada, 36 CRIME & JUST. 297, 341–42 (2007). 
 31. Such proposals would face a number of practical and theoretical im-
pediments. By and large, the United States lacks the tradition of acquiescing 
to the positions of policy experts and scholars when popular views are to the 
contrary. In fact, at least some punitive lawmaking has been the result of 
widespread resentment and distrust of criminal justice experts. See, e.g., 
STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 43–48 (2012); 
ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 28, at 159–77. Moreover, one type of 
ostensibly non-political criminal justice agency, the sentencing commission 
used in the federal and state systems, has generated mixed results at best. 
See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 28, at 211. See generally KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. 
CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 104–42 (1998) (critiquing federal sentencing guidelines); Erik Luna, 
Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 25, 35–48 (2005) [hereinafter Luna, Gridland] (same). Political 
independent agencies also raise questions of constitutional validity, where the 
agency, in Justice Scalia’s famous phrase, acts as “a sort of junior-varsity Con-
gress” that could prove to be a dangerous improvisation of constitutional 
structure. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dis-
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governance could not be left to majoritarian decision making, 
where reason may be trumped by the passions of a sufficiently 
large number.32 Even classical theorists sympathetic to broader 
participation in government affairs recognized a superior role 
for elites and experts (sometimes believed to be one and the 
same).33
For present purposes, the most interesting aspect of this 
discussion is the very idea of bureaucratization as a means to 
improve the criminal process in the United States. Truth be 
told, American criminal justice already is a bureaucracy, which 
can be defined as “a system of government in which most of the 
important decisions are taken by state officials rather than by 
elected representatives.”
 The tyranny of the majority has always haunted demo-
cratic bodies, which were seen as not only immoderate and 
shortsighted but also inefficient and lacking the knowledge and 
experience necessary to deal with the problems of a specialized 
field, whether it was preserving public order or protecting the 
public fisc. For democracy to work, it was argued, the public’s 
unvarnished opinion must be moderated by institutions of good 
government. Today, those institutions almost invariably take 
the shape of a bureaucracy, modernity’s signal style of authori-
ty and the principal structure of organized power, both public 
and private, in the United States.  
34 Many criminal justice actors fit 
Michael Lipsky’s concept of “street-level bureaucrats,”35 who 
execute overarching public policies through individual case 
decision-making. This is hardly news. The long-term trend in 
America has been toward professionalism in criminal justice 
and an emphasis on bureaucratic desiderata of rationality and 
efficiency.36
                                                                                                                                                                             
senting) (describing the U.S. Sentencing Commission). 
 Those officials variously described as “regulars,” 
“insiders,” and “repeat players,”—law enforcement agents, 
 32. See generally Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to Judicial Review, 
92 VA. L. REV. 991, 994 (2006) (noting that in the Platonic tradition, judicial 
review played a non-majoritarian watchdog role). 
 33. See SUSAN GORDON, MONTESQUIEU: THE FRENCH PHILOSOPHER WHO 
SHAPED MODERN GOVERNMENT 86–87 (2006); Gregory R. Johnson, The First 
Founding Father: Aristotle on Freedom and Popular Government, in LIBERTY 
AND DEMOCRACY 29, 49 (Tibor R. Machan ed., 2002) (discussing Aristotles’s 
argument for popular government that excludes the general populace from 
“the greatest offices”). 
 34. Bureaucracy, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/english/bureaucracy (last visited Apr. 23, 2013). 
 35. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF 
THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES 3 (rev. ed. 2010). 
 36. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 29, 251, 391 (1993). 
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prosecutors, defense attorneys, trial judges, probation officers, 
and others—utterly dominate the criminal process.37
III. 
 
These criminal justice professionals, both individually and 
collectively, can be examined through the lens of organization 
theory, the conceptual underpinnings of which trace back to 
Max Weber and his typology of authority. As one of the “ideal 
types” of authority,38
• clearly demarcated jurisdiction or areas of competence 
for a given organization;  
 bureaucracies are distinguishable by a 
series of characteristics, including:  
• bounded power and division of labor among officials by 
expertise;  
• control and supervision exercised through an organiza-
tional hierarchy;  
• ability to appeal decisions from lower to higher levels of 
the hierarchy;  
• official conduct limited by generally applicable rules 
formulated and recorded in writing;  
• separation of officials from organizational property, 
rights, interests, etc.;  
• selection of officials based on examinations and qualifi-
cations such as higher education and specialized train-
ing; and 
• official positions not owned but instead held as careers 
of full-time employment with salaried compensation, 
tenure protections, and promotion by seniority or mer-
it.39
Weber emphasized that his ideal types did not exist in 
their “pure” forms.
  
40
                                                                                                                                                                             
 37. See BIBAS, supra note 
 For example, bureaucracies could still be 
31, at 15–20, 30–34. 
 38. See MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 90 
(Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch eds. & trans., 4th ed. 1968) [hereinafter 
WEBER, METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES] (“An ideal type is formed by 
the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis 
of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent 
concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-
sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct.”). 
 39. See MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZA-
TION 329–41 (Talcott Parsons ed., Talcott Parsons & A.M. Henderson trans., 
rev. ed. 1964) [hereinafter WEBER, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION]. 
 40. See WEBER, METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 38, 
at 90. 
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managed by charismatic or class-based leadership.41 In fact, 
most government bureaucracies in the United States are head-
ed by elected officials or political appointees.42 Nonetheless, 
“[b]ureaucratic administration means fundamentally the exer-
cise of control on the basis of knowledge. This is the feature of 
it which makes it specifically rational.”43
Pursuant to this account, bureaucracies are marked by im-
personal and rule-bound decision making. Weber wrote: “The 
dominant norms are concepts of straightforward duty without 
regard to personal considerations. Everyone is subject to formal 
equality of treatment. . . .”
 By rational, Weber is 
referring to instrumental rationality (rather than substantive 
or value rationality); that is, the accomplishment of a prede-
termined goal or set of goals in the most efficient and effective 
way. So understood, a bureaucracy may be portrayed as objec-
tive and methodical in serving the externally selected ends, the 
means to which can be discerned through the expertise of offi-
cialdom.  
44
Although considered outdated by organization theorists, 
Weber’s concepts have had a profound impact on the study of 
bureaucracy and “still serve as the starting point for most work 
on the subject.”
 Such consistency is ensured by 
laws and regulations promulgated pursuant to those laws, 
which constrain an official’s scope of decision making, perhaps 
to the point of leaving him no discretion at all. As such, bureau-
cracy poses no threat to democracy, or so it is argued. The rele-
vant ends are chosen by the principals—the people via their 
political representatives—with bureaucratic action taken pur-
suant to rules oriented toward achieving those ends.  
45
                                                                                                                                                                             
 41. See WEBER, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 
 Most important for present purposes, the con-
39, at 
329, 332–33, 335–36. 
 42. Cf. James P. Pfiffner, Political Appointees and Career Executives: The 
Democracy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 57, 
57–58 (1987) (noting the severe increase in political appointees). 
 43. See WEBER, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 39, at 
339. 
 44. 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 225 (Guenther Roth & Claus 
Wittich eds., rev. ed. 1978) [hereinafter WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY]. 
 45. Philip S. Gorski, The Protestant Ethic and the Bureaucratic Revolu-
tion: Ascetic Protestantism and Administrative Rationalization in Early Mod-
ern Europe, in MAX WEBER’S ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: A CRITICAL COMPANION 
267, 267 (Charles Camic et al. eds., 2005); see also Talcott Parsons, Introduc-
tion to WEBER, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 39, at 3, 77 
(ultimately concluding that Weber’s analysis of authority “constitutes the most 
highly developed and broadly applicable conceptual scheme in any comparable 
field which is available, not only in the specifically sociological literature, but 
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cepts often track the bureaucratic reality of modern criminal 
justice. As noted in one textbook on law enforcement admin-
istration, “the management of police agencies reflects Weber’s 
ideal bureaucracy,” as these “organizations hold sacred the con-
cepts of rationality, hierarchy, specialization and positional au-
thority.”46
For instance, prosecutor’s offices typically employ a com-
petitive process for selecting new deputies, whose professional 
profile will include, at a minimum, a law school degree and 
state bar membership. They will receive some form of initial 
training, formal or informal, and will participate in continuing 
legal education throughout their careers. In large offices, each 
deputy prosecutor will be assigned to a division, unit, or 
branch, which focuses on a particular type of offense or offender 
(e.g., domestic violence, gangs, juvenile delinquency, etc.) or a 
specific stage of the criminal process (e.g., investigations, felony 
trials, appeals, etc.). In addition, an office may adopt a policy of 
“horizontal prosecution,” where the same attorney handles a 
case from beginning to end; “vertical prosecution,” with differ-
ent attorneys handling different stages of the process; or a 
combination of vertical and horizontal prosecution depending 
on the type of offense or offender. 
 Every component of criminal justice is bounded by its 
jurisdiction in terms of political geography and subject matter, 
such as the city attorney who is limited to prosecuting misde-
meanors committed within the borders of his municipality. 
Criminal justice actors are also constrained by their compe-
tence at a given task, typically through the division of labor by 
specialization and with an emphasis on professionalism 
through credentialing, examination, training, and so on.  
As is true with other bureaucracies, the components of 
criminal justice tend to be hierarchical in nature, the most ob-
vious example being a pyramidal court structure. In general, 
the decision making and review within a state judiciary ex-
tends upward from trial courts, which may be divided into low-
er and higher levels (e.g., municipal and superior); to interme-
diate appellate courts, with a few states creating special crimi-
nal appellate courts (e.g., Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals); and then to the state supreme court. On issues of federal 
law, that “hierarchy” would extend further to the U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in that of social science as a whole”). 
 46. V.A. LEONARD & HARRY W. MORE, POLICE ORGANIZATION AND MAN-
AGEMENT 5 (9th ed. 2000). 
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Court and, via the writ of habeas corpus, to federal trial and 
appellate courts.  
The insiders of criminal justice possess special knowledge. 
They are trained in the official law on the books establishing 
substantive crimes and punishments, as well as the complicat-
ed legal rules governing the criminal process from investigation 
to incarceration. The insiders also have access to the infor-
mation concerning a particular crime and criminal, including 
police reports, witness statements, forensic analysis, prior case 
files, and so on. Most of all, they understand the practical work-
ings of criminal justice in their jurisdiction, especially the 
norms of case negotiation and plea bargaining.  
The decisions in any given case are supposed to be imper-
sonal and rational in the Weberian sense, based on the availa-
ble information and the relevant law, not personal relation-
ships between criminal justice actors and affected individuals. 
In some contexts, such as pre-trial detention and corrections, 
officials are instructed to maintain a social distance from those 
impacted by their actions. After all, the polestar of criminal jus-
tice is not some relational value but the efficient achievement 
of politically determined ends—such as the utilitarian goals of 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—all within re-
source constraints set by external political decisions. 
Like other prominent bureaucracies in our high-tech, fast-
paced, multifaceted society, criminal justice may appear “com-
pletely indispensable.”47
[A bureaucracy] is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of 
attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally 
the most rational known means of exercising authority over human 
beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the 
stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possi-
ble a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads 
of the organization and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally 
superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations 
and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative 
tasks.
  
48
As such, Weber argued, the only choice is between bureaucracy 
on the one hand and dilettantism on the other. 
 
Weber understood that his account of rational-legal author-
ity depicted bureaucracy as a machine. This is a well-known 
conception of criminal justice. Over the past century, the Su-
preme Court opinions have referred to “the Federal machinery 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 47. 1 WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 44, at 223. 
 48. Id. 
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for administering criminal justice”49 and “the criminal justice 
machinery of the State”;50 “the awful machinery of the criminal 
law”51 and the “misuse of the criminal machinery”;52 “the 
movement for increasing social control through criminal ma-
chinery”;53 the determination of lawmakers “to turn the screw 
of the criminal machinery—detection, prosecution and punish-
ment—tighter and tighter”;54 arrests, searches, and seizures as 
the “incidental machinery of the criminal law”55 and juries as 
“part of the machinery of a criminal court”;56 and setting in mo-
tion “the whole machinery of criminal justice”57 and permitting 
“the intrusion of the whole machinery of the criminal law.”58
Legal scholarship has also employed this metaphor, the 
most recent example being Professor Bibas’s aptly titled book, 
The Machinery of Criminal Justice.
  
59 A half-century ago, Her-
bert Packer famously described two theoretical models—the 
“crime control” model and the “due process” model—as a means 
of evaluating opposing values in the criminal process.60
                                                                                                                                                                             
 49. McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 673 (1982) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (quotation omitted). 
 The 
crime control model emphasized public order and crime preven-
tion, and toward these ends, it sought maximum efficiency, de-
fined as “the system’s capacity to apprehend, try, convict, and 
dispose of a high proportion of criminal offenders whose offens-
 50. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 454 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 51. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 950 (1988) (quoting United 
States v. Schackney, 33 F.2d 475, 487 (2d Cir. 1964)). 
 52. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 149 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissent-
ing); see also Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 419 (1945) (“Under our form 
of government the machinery of criminal justice depends for its force and effi-
ciency upon the enlightened moral sense of the individuals to whom the public 
by their constitution and laws have temporarily entrusted its operation.”). 
 53. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 314 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting). 
 54. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981) (quoting Gore v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 386, 390 (1958)). 
 55. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 56. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163 (1908); see also Ex Parte Quirin, 
317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942) (“Presentment by a grand jury and trial by a jury of the 
vicinage where the crime was committed were at the time of the adoption of 
the Constitution familiar parts of the machinery for criminal trials in the civil 
courts.”). 
 57. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 201 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting).  
 58. Poe, 367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 59. See BIBAS, supra note 31. 
 60. See Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1 (1964) [hereinafter Packer, Two Models]. 
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es become known.”61 This model was analogized to an “assem-
bly line” with “an endless stream of cases” on a conveyor belt, 
where each step in the process “involves a series of routinized 
operations” to screen out the probably innocent and pass along 
the probably guilty to the next step.62
In essence, Professor Packer was describing criminal jus-
tice as a machine. Like Weber, he emphasized that his models 
were abstractions for comparative analysis. However, he sug-
gested that American criminal justice, as it then operated, “ap-
proximates fairly closely the dictates of the Crime Control mod-
el.”
  
63 In many ways, the resemblance between model and reali-
ty is even closer today. For instance, the crime control model 
places great confidence in early fact-finding, and for this rea-
son, “the remaining stages of the process can be relatively per-
functory without any loss in operating efficiency.”64 In particu-
lar, the model’s optimal outcome tends to be a guilty plea, 
which provides the most efficient means for disposing the vast 
majority of cases while consuming the least amount of re-
sources.65 Likewise, the real-world machinery of criminal jus-
tice relies heavily on early fact-finding by law enforcement, es-
pecially prosecutors,66 with nine out of every ten cases now re-
solved by plea bargain.67
                                                                                                                                                                             
 61. Id. at 10. 
  
 62. Id. at 11. In contrast, the “due process” model stressed the importance 
of individual autonomy and dignity, always recognizing that coercive law en-
forcement has the potential for abuse and must “be subjected to controls and 
safeguards that prevent it from operating with maximal efficiency.” Id. at 16. 
But see, e.g., Mirjan Damas̆ka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two 
Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 
574–77 (1973) (noting that Packer’s “due process” model could be so concerned 
with protecting individual rights, that it could run the risk of acquitting the 
guilty); John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, or a Third “Model” of 
the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970) (proposing that Packer’s “two 
models” actually rest upon the single premise that the nature of criminal pro-
cess is a battleground, where the only variable is based on which party holds 
the advantage). 
 63. Herbert L. Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 57 J. 
CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 238, 239 (1966). Professor Packer did 
note that the Warren Court was “rapidly providing a view that looks more and 
more like the Due Process model” through its decisions in cases such as Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
Packer, supra, at 239. Arguably, however, the pendulum has swung back from 
due process to crime control through decisions of the Burger, Rehnquist, and 
Roberts Courts. 
 64. Packer, Two Models, supra note 60, at 12.  
 65. Id. at 13. 
 66. See, e.g., Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413, 1481–86 (2010); Gerard E. Lynch, Our Adminis-
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IV. 
Professor Packer made clear that he was not making value 
choices, and, as a result, the “models may not be labeled Good 
and Bad.”68 By contrast, Weber has at times been mischaracter-
ized as a proponent of bureaucratization. In fact, however, he 
harbored a profound skepticism about the “irresistible” “for-
ward progress of bureaucratic mechanization,” which takes “as 
the highest and only goal” “a purely technical and faultless ad-
ministration, a precise and objective solution of concrete solu-
tions,” and which it achieves “as objectively, precisely, and 
‘soullessly’ as any machine.”69 Weber warned against “mechani-
zation in the sphere of government and politics,” where “the 
performance of each individual is mathematically measured, 
each man becomes a little cog in the machine and, aware of 
this, his one preoccupation is whether he can become a bigger 
cog.”70 Weber worried that, rather than setting people free, the 
cloak of rationality could become “an iron cage” for man, a 
“mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive 
self-importance.”71 The perfection of the bureaucratic structure 
involves it becoming “dehumanized.”72
This account rings true today for many Americans,
  
73 with 
the common perception being rather negative: bureaucracies 
are too big, too complex, too inflexible, and too impersonal.74 
Some commentators consider such criticism unfair, at least 
when applied indiscriminately to all government agencies.75
                                                                                                                                                                             
trative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2136–38 (1998). 
 
 67. See LINDSEY DEVERS, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, PLEA AND 
CHARGE BARGAINING: RESEARCH SUMMARY 3 (2011), available at https://www 
.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf. 
 68. Packer, Two Models, supra note 60, at 5–6.  
 69. J.P. MAYER, MAX WEBER AND GERMAN POLITICS 125–31 (2d ed. 1944).  
 70. Id. at 126. 
 71. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 
181–82 (Talcott Parsons trans., rev. ed. 1976) [hereinafter WEBER, 
PROTESTANT ETHIC]. 
 72. 2 WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 44, at 975. 
 73. See generally RALPH P. HUMMEL, THE BUREAUCRATIC EXPERIENCE: 
THE POST-MODERN CHALLENGE 165–68 (5th ed. 2008) (noting that bureau-
cratic “thinking” can be subsumed by the rule, leaving little room for consider-
ing reality). 
 74. See, e.g., Robert L. Sanders, The Future of Bureaucracy, 31 REC. 
MGMT. Q. 44 (1997); Claudia Buck, Maligned, Tedious, but Essential, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 1, 1985, at A1; Patrick T. Murphy, It’s Granny vs. the 
Bureaucracy, CHI. TRIB., June 5, 1990, at 15. 
 75. See, e.g., Buck, supra note 74, at A1 (“‘People like to complain about 
bureaucracy, but the alternative—everybody taking care of things for them-
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Regardless, most people recognize the machine-like nature of 
bureaucracy,76 where the comparison is more than just a trope. 
In his book, The Bureaucratic Experience, Ralph Hummel of-
fered the following contrast between the traditional expecta-
tions of bureaucracy (misunderstandings) and real-world expe-
riences (understandings).77
 
 
 Misunderstandings Understandings 
Socially Bureaucrats deal with people. 
Bureaucrats deal with cas-
es. 
Culturally 
Bureaucrats care about the 
same things we do: justice, 
freedom, violence, oppression, 
illness, death, victory, defeat, 
love, hate, salvation, and 
damnation. 
Bureaucrats aim at control 
and efficiency. 
Psychologically 
Bureaucrats are people like 
us. 
Bureaucrats are a new 
personality type, headless 
and soulless. 
Linguistically 
Communication with bureau-
crats is possible: we all speak 
the same language, we think 
the same way. 
Bureaucrats shape and 
inform rather than com-
municate. 
Cognitively 
Bureaucrats think the way we 
do: logically and sensibly. 
Bureaucrats use logic only: 
they are trained to think 
the way computers think. 
Politically 
Bureaucracies are service in-
stitutions accountable to socie-
ty and ruled by politics and 
government. 
Bureaucracies are control 
institutions increasingly 
ruling society, politics, and 
government. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
selves—would be far worse. It would be very expensive and we wouldn’t want 
to pay for it,’ said Nicole Biggart, a University of California, Davis, professor. 
Bureaucracy, Biggart said, is ‘the best thing we have.’”). See generally 
CHARLES T. GOODSELL, THE CASE FOR BUREAUCRACY: A PUBLIC ADMINISTRA-
TION POLEMIC (4th ed. 2003) (finding bureaucracies often are subject to dis-
crimination and fears about their size); H. Brinton Milward & Hal G. Rainey, 
Don’t Blame the Bureaucracy!, 3 J. PUB. POL’Y 149 (1983) (arguing that public 
bureaucracy in the United States is effective and undervalued). 
 76. See, e.g., Buck, supra note 74, at A1 (“California’s bureaucracy is a 
clean machine.”); Irvin Molotsky, Bureaucracy Just Another Machine Stalled 
in Snow at Nation’s Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1987, at B2; Murphy, supra 
note 74, at 15 (“After a while, bureaucracies begin to resemble gigantic Rube 
Goldberg machines . . . .”).  
 77. See HUMMEL, supra note 73, at 8–9, Exhibit 1.1. 
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Rational depersonalization can readily become dehumani-
zation in a bureaucracy, giving it “the appearance of an unfa-
miliar, inhuman machine that is frightening to the customer or 
citizen.”78
For instance, the tools of modernity, particularly high-
speed transportation and communication, may provide greater 
opportunities for criminal justice officials and lay citizens to 
communicate, and yet the substance of any contact may be 
formal, if not pro forma, often limited to providing details about 
the crime or criminal for use by the experts. Despite reform ef-
forts, crime victims can still be marginalized in the criminal 
process, with any notice and participation rights more honored 
in the breach than the observance. In Nils Christie’s words, vic-
tims can be “reduced to the triggerer-off of the whole thing.”
 Ironically, the modern bureaucratic state makes peo-
ple more and more interdependent and thus brings them closer 
together in a physical sense, yet it separates individuals 
through the impersonal nature of the relationship—official-
worker as cog in a bureaucratic machine and citizen-client as 
input in the form of a case. Instrumentally rational action di-
rected at preset goals thus supplants the usual modes of social 
interaction that involve personal recognition and orientation 
toward one another.  
79
The objectification is even more obvious for the defendant, 
who is transformed into a case in court and a number in lock-
up. In the guise of a criminal case with certain general charac-
teristics, the defendant can be categorized and his fate quanti-
fied by the “going rate” for a given offense in terms of plea bar-
gains and sentences. That professionals view their job as man-
aging objects comes through in the rhetoric—for instance, when 
prosecutors speak about issues of “witness control” or defense 
attorneys bemoan problems of “client control.” By and large, 
these concerns are not raised by professional witnesses such as 
law enforcement agents and forensic experts. 
  
Officialdom has its own special language, bureaucratese 
(a.k.a., gobbledygook)—filled with technical terms and jargon, 
abstractions and circumlocutions, buzzwords and euphemisms, 
peppered with acronyms and characterized by verbosity—
making it virtually unintelligible to those outside the bureau-
cracy.80
                                                                                                                                                                             
 78. Sanders, supra note 
 Lawyers also use a language foreign to the average in-
74, at 48. 
 79. Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 
(1977). 
 80. See, e.g., HUMMEL, supra note 73, at 132–58; Bureaucratese, MERRIAM 
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dividual: legalese.81 In particular, an ordinary person may be 
baffled by the legal idiom of criminal justice, including the def-
inition of substantive crimes,82 the phrasing of evidentiary 
rules,83 and the judicial formulation of criminal sentences.84 
Even the most fundamental legal terms such as the criminal 
standard for conviction, “proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” can 
be problematical if not totally inscrutable.85 Worse yet, some 
appellate courts have admonished prosecutors and trial judges 
against attempting to provide more comprehensible legal in-
structions.86 The use of technical language, so far removed from 
colloquial speech and ordinary writing, not only demonstrates 
mechanistic nature of criminal justice but also segregates the 
professional from the lay citizen, effectively serving as a form of 
linguistic exclusion.87
                                                                                                                                                                             
WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
bureaucratese (last visited Apr. 23, 2013); see also Alfred E. Kahn, My War 
Against Bureaucratese, Address at Kendal in Ithaca, N.Y. (July 21, 1998), 
available at http://www2.owen.vanderbilt.edu/lukefroeb/files/Bureaucratese_ 
tlk.doc. 
 
 81. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, The Wrong Stuff, 1992 BYU L. REV. 325, 328 
(noting the following legal jargon in an appellate brief: “LBEs complaint more 
specifically alleges that NRB failed to make an appropriate determination of 
RTP and TIP conformity to SIP”).  
 82. See, e.g., People v. Mai, 22 Cal. App. 4th 117, 126 (1994) (noting that 
the jury instruction on the “provocative act” doctrine of homicide law had “suc-
cumbed to legalese, unfortunately”); Patton v. State, 34 So. 3d 563, 574 (Miss. 
2010) (Kitchens, J., concurring) (“A properly drafted false pretense indictment 
is replete with essential legalese, long required by this Court, that would be 
unfamiliar to most attorneys, even law professors, other than those with sig-
nificant experience as prosecutors, criminal defense attorneys or judges in 
Mississippi’s criminal courts.”). 
 83. See, e.g., Arredondo v. Ortiz, 365 F.3d 778, 787 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (“The prosecution could have introduced this evi-
dence as proof that Hansen had committed a crime of moral turpitude, and did 
seek to use it to impeach Hansen’s statement to Arredondo’s investigator that 
Hansen did not know Reed because he did not associate with alcoholics. Or, to 
dispense with the legalese, the prosecution wanted to tell the jury that Hansen 
was a thief and a drunk and thus not believable.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Luna, Gridland, supra note 31, at 38 & n.74 (providing ex-
ample of an incomprehensible sentencing statement). 
 85. See, e.g., Erik Luna, System Failure, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1201, 1212 
n.36 (2005) (noting problems with the standard). 
 86. See, e.g., State v. Herring, No. 104,252, 2011 WL 4440392, at *4 (Kan. 
Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2011) (“Kansas courts have repeatedly admonished prosecu-
tors about explaining the reasonable-doubt standard in their own words since 
reasonable doubt is best defined by the words themselves. Even trial courts 
are encouraged not to give more expansive definitions of the term when re-
quested to by the jury.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 87. Cf. United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14–15 (1st Cir. 1973) (dis-
cussing defendant’s right to a translator in criminal proceedings). 
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In the bureaucratic style, the exclusion is also physical. 
Key decisions such as plea agreements are reached outside of 
public view, behind the closed doors of a conference room, in 
hushed conversations in courtroom hallways, or in phone calls 
between prosecutor and defense attorney. Even public proceed-
ings tend to be sparsely attended affairs, which may only me-
morialize decisions reached elsewhere by the professionals 
themselves. The role of the accused in his own case can be quite 
limited due in large part to the complexity of the criminal pro-
cess and the (usually correct) belief that the professionals know 
best. The defendant’s in-court participation is often no more 
than a few scripted words (e.g., not guilty), with any greater 
involvement regarded as perilous. For the vast majority of pro-
ceedings, including those with dispositive case outcomes, there 
is no participatory part for victims, witnesses, community 
members, and other citizens. Moreover, the public does not ob-
serve the implementation of sentence, with corporal punish-
ments (except death) having been eliminated and deprivations 
of liberty occurring behind the walls of jails and prisons.88
As noted, bureaucratic action is both driven and limited by 
the externally selected goals, which may, in fact, be well-
intentioned and generally humane. The problem is that bu-
reaucracies are not supposed to consider other objectives out-
side the machinery, including those that may be crucial to an 
individual or group. The ends and means are defined in the 
past by statutory or administrative rules (or standards, poli-
cies, procedures, etc.); these rules, in turn, determine whether a 
human will now be transformed into a case for purposes of 
providing benefits or exercising control. That the rules may not 
capture the past or fit the present or serve the future is ulti-
mately irrelevant for a system that comprehends life as an in-
animate object or set of information rather than an ongoing 
project of being. Dehumanization is made nearly inevitable by 
concerns of rationalization, bureaucracy’s raison d’être (or, per 
Pierre Schlag, raison de bureaucracy),
 
89
Ironically, then, the operational goals of criminal justice 
are silently transformed. Rather than values such as accuracy, 
 typically assessed by 
quantitative measurements. People become cases; cases become 
statistics; statistics become evidence of performance.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
 88. For the history behind this movement, see, for example, BIBAS, supra 
note 31, at 20–23; FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 77–82. 
 89. Pierre J. Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 801, 881 (1991). 
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deterrence, and retribution, the system is driven by efficiency 
as measured by, inter alia, arrests, prosecutions, convictions, 
sentences, and, of course, expenditures. Although this might be 
said to achieve a sort of aggregate justice, Weberian instrumen-
tal rationality in the criminal justice process has in a sense be-
come not just a means to an end but an end itself. Unlike Pack-
er’s crime control model, where efficiency maximized public or-
der and crime prevention, efficient case management is neces-
sary to keep the machine from grinding to a halt. Recently, my 
colleague J.D. King encapsulated the impersonal experience of 
most defendants: “Individually, their cases might command the 
scrutiny of a police officer for a couple of hours, a prosecutor for 
a couple of minutes, and a judge for a couple of moments.”90
Weber famously referenced the modern judge as an “au-
tomaton” or “vending machine” into which legal documents and 
fees are inserted and “which then disgorges the judgment to-
gether with the reasons mechanically derived from the Code.”
 
With increasingly large caseloads and limited time and re-
sources, the machine must be set for quick, coarse grading of 
the bulk of cases flowing through the criminal justice system.  
91 
Although Weber noted that “this conception is angrily reject-
ed,”92 a number of American jurisdictions have espoused this 
methodology in recent years through the adoption of hyper-
determinate sentencing systems. Epitomized by the U.S. Sen-
tencing Guidelines, these schemes pursue the legislated ends—
which may include otherwise legitimate goals of punish-
ment93—by dehumanizing the offense and offender, typically 
allowing consideration of only a limited number of factors and 
banning all others, thereby reducing the judge’s role to “filling 
in the blanks and applying a rigid, mechanical formula.”94
                                                                                                                                                                             
 90. John D. King, Procedural Justice, Collateral Consequences, and the 
Adjudication of Misdemeanors, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PER-
SPECTIVE, supra note 
 
5, at 20, 21. 
 91. LEWIS A. COSER, MASTERS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT: IDEAS IN HIS-
TORICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 231 (1971); 2 WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 
supra note 44, at 979. 
 92. 2 WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 44, at 979. 
 93. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006) (directing courts to impose sen-
tences that “reflect the seriousness of the offense,” “afford adequate deter-
rence,” “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” and “provide 
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or 
other correctional treatment”). 
 94. United States v. Russell, 685 F. Supp. 1245, 1249 (N.D. Ga. 1988). See 
also Luna, Gridland, supra note 31, at 39. To some extent, this has changed as 
a result of the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220 (2005), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
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The dehumanization works both ways, such that profes-
sionals themselves come to be viewed as part of the machine. 
Just as Weber spoke of “[s]pecialists without spirit, sensualists 
without heart,”95 today’s bureaucratic officials have been de-
scribed as “cold,” “unfeeling,” “robotic,” even “headless and soul-
less.”96 Likewise, criminal justice professionals may be per-
ceived as mechanical, with their decisions driven by the 
routinization of work and their incorporation into the machine 
requiring a certain relinquishment of individual personality 
into the job identity. “Who we are socially is replaced by what 
we are to the organization.”97 Many police departments incul-
cate a military-style chain of authority, strict discipline, and 
standardized procedures. Moreover, machine-like law enforce-
ment may be “the inevitable product of the drudgery of routine 
labor that ultimately dulls the brain and saps the spirit,” where 
officers “chain their brain at the gate coming in, function 
through their shift, and pick it up again on the way out.”98
V. 
  
The entire criminal process represents an exclusionary at-
titude toward harmful and anti-social acts, which are dealt 
with by government machinery rather than the affected indi-
viduals or the broader community. The approach creates a so-
cial distance between ordinary citizens and the legal system 
operated in their name. Run entirely by professionals, the crim-
inal justice machinery is either non-existent or peripheral to 
the lives of most Americans, who rarely find themselves in 
courtrooms, prosecutor’s offices, police departments, correction-
al facilities, or any other building associated with crime and 
punishment. 
The fact that most people do not frequent these places 
spares them from having to deal with the complexities of crimi-
nal justice. This may be preferable for a populace constantly 
seeking entertainment and collectively suffering from attention 
deficit disorder. “Democratic institutions are quarantine ar-
                                                                                                                                                                             
 95. WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, supra note 71, at 182. 
 96. HUMMEL, supra note 73, at 9. Professor Hummel offered the following 
note: “The terms ‘headless’ and ‘soulless’ here evoked strong protests from 
some employees of modern organizations. It may be worthwhile to point out 
that these terms reflect a tendency that bureaucratic life forces on bureau-
crats, rather than the actual characteristics of specific individuals.” Id. 
 97. Id. at 53. 
 98. Chris R. Braiden, Enriching Traditional Roles, in POLICE MANAGE-
MENT: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 87, 96 (Larry T. Hoover ed., 1992).  
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rangements to combat that ancient pestilence, lust for tyran-
ny,” Nietzsche once wrote.99 And “as such they are very useful 
and very boring.”100
With professionals taking on the onerous tasks, the social 
distance only increases between the criminal justice system 
and the public. As such, the problem is not just that people 
harbor misconceptions about crime and punishment, which can 
have detrimental effects on public policy, or that the average 
citizen is largely unaware of the actual workings of the crimi-
nal justice system.
 The same is true of criminal justice. Anyone 
who has ever witnessed the en masse process of the misde-
meanor calendar in metropolitan courthouses would know full 
well that routine criminal proceedings can be very boring in-
deed.  
101
The social distance also relieves people from having to 
grapple with the stories and suffering of those embroiled in the 
system. Average citizens do not observe criminal processes 
firsthand, leaving to others the tedium of keeping watch for 
potential abuses and miscarriages of justice. This dissociation 
makes the public particularly susceptible to crime-related me-
dia frenzies and demagogic calls to ban more conduct and im-
pose harsher punishments.
 The public is not compelled to understand 
the system, nor, for that matter, is it even provided a good rea-
son to do so.  
102
Most of all, detachment allows the public to evade respon-
sibility and disclaim any ownership of the machinery. Some-
where, out there, defendants are being fed into the machine, 
where their cases are processed and the upshot determined. 
Ordinary people do not pull the levers, they do not monitor the 
operations, and, for the most part, they avoid any contact. The 
criminal justice system is out of sight, out of mind, so to speak. 
The obscurity serves as a mechanism of what Zygmunt Bau-
 These outbursts are not so much 
a challenge to the criminal justice system as its proliferation, 
consistent with an acceptance of the machinery as inexorable, if 
not indispensable—all of which makes it difficult for the public 
to envision an alternative other than ratcheting up the 
punitiveness.  
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man described as “adiaphorization,” the process of making cer-
tain actions exempt from moral evaluation. This is achieved by, 
among other things: 
social production of distance, which either annuls or weakens the 
pressure of moral responsibility; substitution of technical for moral 
responsibility, which effectively conceals the moral significance of the 
action; and the technology of segregation and separation, which pro-
motes indifference to the plight of [people who] otherwise would be 
subject to moral evaluation and morally motivated response.103
For criminal justice actors, bureaucratization also elimi-
nates the idea of personal responsibility. At times, it may be 
displaced to someone else higher up the chain of command; in a 
hierarchy, an official is always bound by the dictates of others, 
supplanting conscience for his action and purging guilt for any 
resulting adversity. The need to choose among potential actions 
may be alleviated by the division of labor, the borders estab-
lished by job descriptions, and the sense of compulsion from 
rules. As Professor Schlag suggested, a type of “bureaucratic 
morality” informs official responses such as the following: “It’s 
not by job”; “Some other department”; “I don’t make the rules, I 
just follow them”; “I wish I could, but I simply can’t . . . do 
that”; and “I’m sorry, your file is not in here.”
 
104
VI. 
 In the end, 
however, it is the machine that bears responsibility and not the 
bureaucracy’s workers, supervisors, and clients or the politi-
cians and citizens in whose name the bureaucracy was created. 
Of course, the foregoing image of criminal justice is an illu-
sion. The system is not a machine but instead an inherently 
human process, with obvious human effects resulting from hu-
man decision-making, which is influenced by the foibles of hu-
man cognition, sentiment, and self-interest. The machine met-
aphor belies the vast discretion exercised by criminal justice 
actors, particularly on the law enforcement side. This miscon-
ception is not costless. As Debra Livingston argued, the “notion 
that police are ministerial officers—an idea that police have 
sometimes encouraged—still pervades much of the public dis-
course about law enforcement in ways detrimental to the rea-
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sonable restraint of arbitrary and capricious police behavior.”105
[The prosecutor] determines whether to accept or decline a case, what 
crimes to allege, and the number of counts to charge. He decides 
whether to participate in plea negotiations and sets the terms of the 
resulting agreements. He directs pretrial and trial strategy, and fre-
quently sets the convicted defendant’s sentence. These choices and 
others like them may be made behind closed doors without much in 
the way of internal supervision or public rationalization, let alone ex-
ternal review. The courts have been loath to interfere with such dis-
cretionary decision making, and lawmakers have tended to expand 
prosecutorial power by enacting new crimes and harsher punish-
ments. Because the American prosecutor exercises unfettered discre-
tion in these judgments, he essentially makes and enforces the law 
and determines the guilt and resulting punishment of those brought 
within the criminal process.
 
The same is true of prosecutors, who rule the criminal justice 
system. 
106
To be sure, there may be entire categories of cases that re-
ceive perfunctory treatment, where one can anticipate with a 
degree of certainty the terms of resolution based on past prac-
tices and courthouse norms. Yet consistency of outcomes should 
not be confused for the absence of discretion or the elimination 
of error. Whether good or bad, knowledgeable or uninformed, 
judgment is always exercised in the enforcement of criminal 
law. With such authority comes responsibility, which is readily 
accepted in good times, less so when things go wrong. As they 
say, success has many fathers, but failure is an orphan. Almost 
always, the parent is killed in a “machine” accident for which 
nothing could have been done to prevent it.  
 
At times, law enforcement may revert to, or hide behind, 
the great chestnut that ours is a government of laws, not men. 
No regime has ever functioned by this Aristotelian maxim, at 
least when it is understood as disallowing all discretionary au-
thority. “Every government has always been a government of 
laws and of men,” Professor Davis emphasized in his landmark 
treatment of official discretion.107
                                                                                                                                                                             
 105. Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism About 
Police Patrol, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 193.  
 Most scholars who chafed at 
Davis’s work did not object to his descriptive account of law en-
forcement power. Rather, it was the notion that official discre-
tion can and should be confined by administrative rulemaking 
subject to public notice and comment. 
 106. Preface to THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra 
note 5, at xi, xi. 
 107. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 17. 
  
2268 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:2245 
 
For instance, one of Davis’s contemporaries, Louis Jaffe, 
questioned the value of opening up for scrutiny certain rule-less 
and at times unsavory law enforcement practices—such as po-
lice use of informants and prosecutorial charging decisions—
which receive public “approval in a kind of covert, perhaps 
shame-faced way.”108
If there is such approval, it involves inevitably the acceptance of the 
arbitrary discretion embodied in Davis' regulation. Little would be 
gained by the regulation other than making public what the society 
prefers not to make public. This under-the-counter approach may of-
fend the Puritan, it may offend the legal theorist, but I am sure that 
those who are offended are in a rather small minority, and if a socie-
ty—a democracy if you will—chooses to operate that way, the appeal 
to general principles of equal protection and formal legality does not 
seem to me to be sufficient.
 
109
Professor Jaffee’s remarks may contain a grain of truth. 
Undoubtedly, there are people who accept a sort of “sausage 
theory” of criminal justice.
 
110
 A good test of the system’s legitimacy is the response of an 
attentive, well-versed community to the ostensibly mechanical 
decisions of law enforcement. Consider, for instance, the prose-
cution of Aaron Swartz, the computer wunderkind and Internet 
activist who helped develop the social news site “Reddit” and 
the web feed format “RSS.” In 2011, he was charged with vari-
ous federal crimes for allegedly downloading “an extraordinary 
volume of articles from JSTOR,”
 They don’t want to know how law 
enforcement is using its discretion—how the sausage is made, 
so to speak—they just want low crime and safe streets. But 
willful ignorance should not be mistaken for legitimation. To 
reiterate, the criminal justice system has taken on the facade of 
a bureaucratic machine, which inhibits popular participation or 
even understanding, and which serves the efficiency interests 
of the bureaucracy itself and the personal interests of the sys-
tem’s repeat players, who can skate responsibility for the myri-
ad discretionary judgments they make. In this context, the 
supposed consent of an anesthetized public hardly qualifies as 
knowing and voluntary. And, needless to say, an officialdom 
that is practically inaccessible, self-interested, and unaccount-
able will be difficult to square with decent conceptions of repre-
sentative democracy. 
111
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tory of scholarly articles. Purportedly, Swartz intended to post 
the articles on file-sharing networks to make them freely avail-
able to the public. The superseding indictment included thir-
teen felony counts carrying the possible (but not necessarily 
probable) outcome of a lengthy prison term upon conviction. 
“Stealing is stealing, whether you use a computer command or 
a crowbar, and whether you take documents, data or dollars,” 
said the U.S. Attorney in announcing the charges.112 “It is 
equally harmful to the victim whether you sell what you have 
stolen or give it away.”113 According to defense counsel, the 
prosecutors maintained this uncompromising line. “They be-
lieved they had to seek prison time and multiple felony convic-
tions in this case,” said one defense attorney.114 Another said he 
had warned the lead prosecutor that Swartz was a suicide risk. 
The prosecutor’s response was “a standard reaction in that of-
fice . . . ‘Fine, we’ll lock him up.’”115
In January 2013, Aaron Swartz committed suicide, “the 
product of a criminal justice system rife with intimidation and 
prosecutorial overreach,” his family said.
 The prosecution stance was 
seemingly rule-bound, inflexible, emotionless—in other words, 
machine-like.  
116 Many people 
agreed, and compared the prosecutor to, inter alia, “Javert, the 
heartless and relentless prosecutor in Victor Hugo’s Les 
Miserables.”117 For present purposes, the validity of these 
claims is not relevant. What is relevant, however, was the gov-
ernment’s response to the backlash. “The career prosecutors 
handling this matter took on the difficult task of enforcing a 
law they had taken an oath to uphold,” the U.S. Attorney 
claimed.118
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up to the judge.”119
In the wake of this sad story, those who found the prosecu-
tor’s approach reasonable and those who found it reprehensible 
appeared to agree that it was in line with routine practice. “It 
works efficiently for the career criminal—even if it may look 
more like an assembly line than justice,” argued James 
Boyle.
 In bureaucratic terms, they had no choice 
and someone else was responsible.  
120 “But its smoothness conceals many flaws—the lack of 
match between behavior and charge, the psychological costs to 
victims when harms are plead down to offenses that were not 
really committed, the way that the operation of our criminal 
justice system goes on in private not in open court.”121 What 
made the Swartz prosecution different, Orin Kerr noted, was 
that “it involved a highly charismatic defendant with very pow-
erful friends in a position to object to these common practic-
es.”122 I would add that the case also inspired public outrage, 
with thousands of people signing online petitions asking the 
President to fire the U.S. Attorney and the lead prosecutor.123
Regardless of the merits, these people took an active inter-
est in what had happened in this case. If only they had the op-
portunity to do it at an earlier stage in the process; if only they 
expressed this interest in other cases, too; if only prosecutors 
and judges were required to respond to their views in a mean-
ingful fashion; if only the insiders and outsiders felt responsible 
for the outcomes and took ownership of our criminal justice sys-
tem. Professors Bierschbach and Bibas have offered one possi-
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ble means to increase public participation in sentencing and a 
good example of the potential benefits from drawing upon the 
tools and experiences of other legal fields. If only their ideas 
and others like them could be brought to fruition and allow the 
public to see criminal justice for what it really is: not a ma-
chine, but a human system with very human consequences.  
 
